“Confirmation bias” is the tendency for people to instinctively seek evidence that supports the opinion they already have. Psychologists know, or should know, that this is common, and nowhere is it more evident than in foreign policy.
I have just finished the second volume of William Manchester’s eminently readable work, “The Glory and the Dream: A Narrative History of America, 1932-1972.” It ends with a lucid description of the Vietnam morass. The parallels with Iraq and Afghanistan are startling. With his particular talent for truth and investigative reporting, Manchester lays bare the confirmation bias that led us deeper and deeper into self-deception. Even so early as 1973, Manchester got it right. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara confirmed not long before his death that it was all basically one big mistake. This is a hard pill to swallow for me as a Vietnam veteran, but it is the truth.
Now, after eight years of the Afghanistan “war,” the Taliban controls more territory than before, Germany won’t fight, and our other NATO allies are wavering in their token support. The recent Afghan election was a farce, and the government there is corrupt (just as South Vietnam’s was corrupt). The body bags are arriving in a steady stream, and the president is considering a surge in American troop strength. Our reserve forces, which were never meant for extended deployments, are seriously stressed. Three-quarters of them come home with psychological problems.
After spending billions of dollars and thousands of lives, will we doggedly follow the path of confirmation bias again? Or will we recognize that we are not responsible for remaking the whole world in our own image, that nation-building is self-defeating and that people resent us when we try to change their culture? Can we admit that sending our soldiers to play “whack-a-mole” against religiously inspired guerrillas is bad strategy? Are we too full of hubris to admit error? Might we do better to spend our resources on strengthening our borders and on our many internal problems? Might we settle simply on setting an example for the world to follow?
I supported our incursion into Iraq. I was wrong. We saved the Iraqi people from a cruel dictator, but our sacrifices are unappreciated. The CIA told the president and the nation what we wanted to hear, and gave us a post-9/11 target on which to vent. More confirmation bias.
George Washington said it well in his farewell address. We should avoid foreign entanglements and mind our own business.
James R. Wheeler is a Joplin resident.